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This paper investigates the effects of trade reforms and antitrust enforcement on the 
pricing behavior of firms, shedding light on the respective contributions of these policy 
instruments to the shaping of competitive markets. To this end, we use a rich panel 
data set of more than 25,000 manufacturing firms from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, spanning a five-year 
period. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between domestic 
firms' mark-ups and industry protection, as reflected in MFN and trade-weighted 
import tariffs. The toughness of competition policy enforcement, captured by the 
number of final instance decisions delivered by national antitrust authorities and an 
index developed by the EBRD, has a negative impact of greater magnitude than import 
penetration. We also test for the significance of enacting major legislative amendments 
with regard to competition policy in the studied countries, as well as for differential 
effects in export-oriented and import-competing industries. 
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This paper investigates the role and interaction of trade and competition policies in the shaping
of competitive markets.1 In contrast to ample theoretical analysis, empirical evidence on the
eﬀects of market intervention via either of the two mechanisms remains somewhat scarce in the
literature. While turnarounds in trade policy have received some attention, cases of gradual
transition have proven more diﬃcult to investigate, mainly due to data availability constraints.
Likewise, the inability to benchmark antitrust enforcement against a quantiﬁable common base
has discouraged empirical analysis of this important policy instrument’s impact. A growing
number of ﬁrm-level studies conﬁrm the premise that import competition might play a role
in curtailing domestic market power. The eﬀects of trade liberalization on companies’ price-
cost margins have been empirically explored by Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994), Krishna
and Mitra (1998), and Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001). Focusing on instances of increased
protection, Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) use a similar approach to investigate the impact
of antidumping measures. These papers’ ﬁndings are in line with theoretical predictions on the
coercive eﬀect of enhanced international competition. However, even in a small open economy
the inﬂuence of import penetration could vary considerably across industries and, in some
cases, may prove insuﬃcient to discipline the pricing behavior of domestic ﬁrms. For lack of
suitable explanatory variables, attempts to estimate the eﬀects of national competition policy
on company price-cost margins have remained much more limited. To date, the only ﬁrm-level
investigation of this kind has been conducted by Konings et al. (2001). In a related analysis
based on aggregate data, Hoekman and Kee (2003) use a large cross-country sample to test
for structural breaks in estimated industry mark-ups, following the adoption of competition
legislation.
A common feature of the studies to date is their dependence on a one-time switch of regime
to identify the respective eﬀects on market contestability. Moreover, the available enterprise-
level evidence is typically limited to the national borders of a single country. In light of the
diﬃculties with quantifying trade and antitrust regimes, the robustness of the studied rela-
tionships should ideally be tested using alternative measures and speciﬁcations, as well as in
consistent cross-country replications. The contribution of this paper to the existing body of
literature is twofold. We trace the evolution of trade policy using detailed annual data and
document the eﬀects of tariﬀ protection in seven Central and Eastern European countries.
1The terms competition policy and antitrust are used interchangeably throughout the paper. The underlying
notion encompasses the correction of anticompetitive practices by undertakings and relevant authorities, as
well as policy advocacy initiatives. Indeed, measures fostering the development of competitive culture and the
natural selection among eﬃcient ﬁrms are particularly relevant in the context of transition.
1In addition, we contribute to the hitherto limited evidence on the role of competition policy
implementation, on the basis of transition economies’ informative experience.
Former centrally planned economies oﬀer an opportune setting for a study of trade and
competition policies’ interaction in inﬂuencing the emergence of competitive pressure. No-
tably, countries acceding to the EU set a particularly interesting precedent, in light of the
shared blueprint for legislative and institutional reforms. The common legacy of extensively
integrated production, both vertically and horizontally, ensured a broadly equivalent starting
point for the economic transformation of post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe. While
opening up to international trade and investment in the aftermath of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (Comecon/CMEA) introduced some contestability in product markets,
imports alone could not foster the formation of strong competitive pressure in all industry
sectors. Accordingly, properly designed and enforced antitrust rules had a crucial role to play
in narrowing the considerable scope for market power abuses in the course of economic trans-
formation. The interplay of trade and competition policies is also pertinent in light of the
latter’s relative decentralization in the process of European integration. Upon accession to
the EU, member states adhere to a uniform trade regime, but retain a degree of autonomy in
the formulation of antitrust rules. While the prospect of overlapping jurisdictions may have
a strong disciplining eﬀect, both on ﬁrms and national competition authorities, the possibility
of sequential enforcement could undermine eﬀectiveness. In that respect, further parallels can
be drawn among transition countries at the outset of institutional reforms. Newly established
antitrust agencies typically lacked the expertise to carry out sophisticated context-speciﬁc anal-
yses, necessary for eﬀective application of competition rules. Moreover, in the absence of prior
experience with antitrust cases, post-socialist judicial systems were poorly equipped to handle
appeals. In fact, the case law of the European Court of Justice has served as a natural reference
point in this context, particularly at the more advanced stage of preparations for EU member-
ship. Notwithstanding the shared commitment to legal and institutional alignment with the
acquis communautaire, the studied economies’ reform experiences are not fully symmetrical.
The evolution of national regulatory frameworks exhibits considerable variation in timing and
policy-making choices, which provide valuable insights regarding the emergence of competitive
pressure. In our attempt to link outcomes to policies, we draw on cross-country, inter-industry
and ﬁrm heterogeneity to disentangle the eﬀects of changes in national trade and antitrust
regimes from the overall impact of structural reforms across the future EU member states.
2Evolution of Trade and Competition Policies
Trade Policy Realignment
Economic transition from plan to market would be impracticable without investment liberal-
ization and a broadening of import and export opportunities. Accordingly, as part of initial
reforms, Central and Eastern European countries sought improved access to markets outside
the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, opening up to greater import penetration
in the process. Most transition economies covered in this study embarked on trade reorienta-
tion with the conclusion of bilateral Agreements of Association with the EU, commonly known
as Europe Agreements. These initiatives also paved the way for legal and institutional har-
monization along the lines of the acquis communautaire. Notably, the Europe Agreements
contained provisions for the fundamental alignment of regulatory frameworks in the areas of
competition policy and state aid to industries. Another common feature of the association
treaties was the asymmetrical timetable, which governed the gradual liberalization of trade in
goods – a maximum period of ﬁve years for the EU and ten years for the respective transition
economies. Nevertheless, the EU maintained substantial levels of protection for a number of
sensitive industrial products, such as certain textiles, some coal and steel products. Acces-
sion countries also applied some discretion in their speciﬁc liberalization commitments, in line
with national priorities. The momentous Europe Agreements were accompanied by a number
of bilateral and plurilateral arrangements redeﬁning preferential trade relations in the region.
Typically, the concluded free trade agreements included provisions for cooperation in the pre-
vention of restrictive business practices that aﬀect cross-border commerce, modeled on the
relevant clauses of the Europe Agreements. In parallel, as a direct consequence of WTO mem-
bership, all studied countries undertook additional liberalization commitments on the principle
of non-discrimination, guaranteeing Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) and national treatment. As
a result, a gradual reduction of MFN tariﬀs was accompanied by stepwise introduction of pref-
erential rates that covered a substantial share of the transition economies’ trade. While, on
aggregate, liberalized bilateral exchanges with the EU had by far the most signiﬁcant economic
impact, import competition among the other preferential trading partners was also increased.
Figure 1 presents an overview of the applied customs duties averaged over all manufacturing
industries. An illustrative breakdown by two-digit NACE sectors and a chronological list of the
relevant trade initiatives are provided in the appendix. Protection from import competition
has generally been reduced over the examined period, albeit with uneven treatment of trading
partners due to the expanding network of preferential agreements in the region. Moreover, the
average ﬁgures conceal the considerable inter-sectoral heterogeneity in market access liberal-













































































































ization within a single country. Import duties on diﬀerent products falling within the same
four-digit NACE sector have been modiﬁed at varying increments over the studied period. As
a result, the average rates of protection corresponding to more ﬁnely delineated manufacturing
industries exhibit highly asymmetrical patterns of transformation. For instance, as shown in
ﬁgure 2, the increased tariﬀ protection observed in Estonia after 1999 is concentrated solely in
the food processing industry and varies signiﬁcantly in magnitude across sub-sectors. By and
large, even if the studied countries follow a broadly similar pattern in regional trade liberal-
ization, signiﬁcant diﬀerences inevitably emerge within and across narrowly deﬁned industries.
These considerations highlight the importance of accounting for barriers to import competition
at high level of sectoral disaggregation and reﬂecting the speciﬁc clauses of relevant preferential
trade agreements. However, although the MFN rates do not capture the latter, they may con-
stitute a more exogenous measure of protection. Being an outcome variable, the trade-weighted
tariﬀ is susceptible to a certain bias, as the volume of imports under free trade agreements is
not independent from the respective preferences granted. Moreover commercial ﬂows are likely
to be endogenous to productivity or endowment shocks.
Competition Policy Implementation
While the transition process entailed a wide array of structural reforms, the realm of compe-
tition policy had to be built from scratch in all Central and Eastern European countries, as
a natural consequence of the common legacy of central planning. Accordingly, the gradual
dismantling of trade barriers was accompanied by the introduction of legislation and institu-
tions for the protection of competition. By 1993, all transition economies under review were
regulated by recently adopted antitrust laws, which constituted a ﬁrst approximation of the rel-
4evant EU rules. Notwithstanding some cross-country heterogeneity in the timing of enactment
and the initial emphasis on implementation, the early enforcement records reveal a common
prevalence of cases not relating to serious distortions of competition.2 In its 1998 reports on
progress toward accession, the ﬁrst round of annual peer reviews, the European Commission
highlights outstanding gaps in the antitrust legislation of each candidate country and recom-
mends a general shift of focus toward investigating hardcore cartels and important mergers.
The individual assessments also broadly converge on shortcomings in institutional design, en-
forcement capacity and expertise, as well as on the need for a qualitative leap in the area of
state aid control. As the accession preparations advance, the respective national frameworks
are more closely aligned with the acquis communautaire and reﬂect the parallel evolution of
EU competition rules.
Table 1: Enactment of Competition Legislation and Subsequent Amendments
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
BG ? ∼ ◦ ∼ ∼
CZ ? ∼ ◦ ∼ ◦ ∼
EE ? ∼ ◦ ∼ ∼ ◦ ∼
HU ? ◦ ∼ ◦ ∼
PL ? ∼ ◦ ∼ ∼ ∼ ∼ ◦ ∼
SI ? ◦ ∼ ∼ ∼
SK ? ◦ ∼ ∼ ◦ ∼
Note: ?/◦/∼ indicate year of initial law adoption/amendment with signiﬁcant changes/amendment with
minor changes, respectively.
Source: Dutz and Vagliasindi (2000) and Competition Authorities’ Annual Reports.
A chronological overview of legislative developments with regard to competition policy in
the respective countries is provided in table 1. Stylized details regarding the scope of im-
provements are listed in the appendix. In each of the seven countries antitrust legislation has
undergone successive amendments, taking into account the initial enforcement experience and
relevant developments in EU practice. Typically, statutory modiﬁcations have redeﬁned the
2Transition economies’ initial experience with competition policy implementation has been analyzed by
Fingleton et al. (1996), centering on the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic, and
Djankov and Hoekman (1997), focusing on Bulgaria. Both studies conclude that the bulk of enforcement
activity has been directed at unfair trade practices rather than hardcore antitrust violations and ﬁnd scope for
more deterring penalties.
5scope of prohibited restrictive agreements, stipulating explicit references to vertical as well as
to horizontal concerted practices and introducing several block exemptions. Further ﬁne-tuning
has resulted in legislative convergence on a number of fundamental principles. Speciﬁcally, the
prohibition of hardcore restrictions irrespective of market power, the possibility for ex oﬃcio
sector-wide inquiry and the codiﬁcation of supply-side substitutability in the deﬁnition of rel-
evant markets have been incorporated in the respective national legislations. Accordingly, the
reﬁnement of national competition laws reveals a general trend toward greater diﬀerentiation
between market power and market share. This important notional distinction has been reﬂected
in revised guidelines for assessment of market dominance and economic concentrations, respec-
tively. Regulations pertaining to abuse of a dominant position have placed stronger emphasis on
the undertaking’s ability to prevent eﬀective competition in the relevant market and to behave,
to a great extent, independently of its competitors, customers and suppliers. Similarly, rational-
ity in the control of concentrations has motivated a move from market share to turnover-based
notiﬁcation thresholds in most countries. The respective grace margins for concentrations and
agreements of minor importance have typically been adjusted upward, indicating a shift toward
priority treatment of hardcore violations. In the same vein, jurisdictional improvements have
targeted the actual capability to inﬂuence the state of competition in a particular market, ex-
tending the coverage of competition rules to public entities, companies with special or exclusive
rights and all associations, irrespective of their legal status. Operational modiﬁcations have
also enabled competition authorities to grant conditional approvals and issue negative clear-
ance, alleviating the case load and ensuring greater legal certainty for undertakings. In parallel,
policy advocacy initiatives have strived to build a competition culture and reinforce the cred-
ibility of both substantive and procedural law. In each of the studied countries, competition
agencies’ advisory opinions on draft laws, governmental decisions and privatization strategies
have fostered the elimination of regulations that distort market competition or impose barriers
to entry.
On the whole, normative and operational improvements have introduced clearer deﬁnitions
of competences, procedural rules and penalty provisions, ensuring further alignment with EU
standards and practice. Clearly, the enhanced level of sophistication has been aimed at im-
proving regulatory precision and ensuring that enforcement capacity would not be overwhelmed
by infringements of minor importance. Annual peer screening exercises, in the framework
of preparations for EU membership, have also contributed to achieving adequate harmoniza-
tion of national legislations with the acquis communautaire. Nevertheless, although legislative
amendments aimed at EU-compatibility have ensured a degree of uniformity on fundamental
principles, notable diﬀerences across national frameworks remain on speciﬁc technical aspects.
6Besides asymmetrical enactment timeframes, the reﬁned legal frameworks maintain a level of
heterogeneity in stipulated thresholds, deadlines and penalties. As with trade barriers, the focus
of antitrust investigations inevitably varies along both the industry and country dimensions,
as well as over time. Unfortunately, quantifying competition policy implementation accord-
ingly proves impossible, especially at higher levels of sectoral disaggregation. However, even
if a particular industry has not been directly aﬀected by investigations or stringent notiﬁca-
tion obligations, ﬁrms may be disciplined by greater awareness of potential penalties through
competition advocacy and eﬀective enforcement in other sectors of the economy. The present
study relies on capturing the overall signaling eﬀect of competition policy implementation on
the basis of cross-country and intertemporal variations in enforcement and advocacy activities.
Empirical Framework
Our empirical investigation is based on an approach to mark-up estimation developed by Roeger
(1995) that builds on a methodology pioneered by Hall (1988). In the absence of input and
output market rigidities, competing ﬁrms price homogenous products at marginal cost. By
contrast, proﬁt maximization in an imperfectly competitive setting would drive a wedge between
the value of marginal product and the corresponding factor cost.3 As shown by Hall (1988), the
price-cost margin can be estimated from the relationship between contemporaneous ﬂuctuations
in output and average factor input.
Consider ﬁrm i operating in industry j at time t according to a standard production function,
homogeneous of degree γ:
Yijt = AijtF(Lijt,Mijt,Kijt) (1)
In the adopted notation A,L,M and K stand for Hicks-neutral technical progress, labor, ma-
terial inputs and capital, respectively.4 Under the current speciﬁcation, the technical progress
term can accommodate both inter-industry heterogeneity and ﬁrm-speciﬁc diﬀerences in tech-




























3In the assumed Cobb-Douglas functional form, there is a uniform gap between each input’s cost and re-
spective marginal product.
4Following Domowitz et al. (1988), Norrbin (1993) and Oliveira-Martins, Pilat, and Scarpetta (1996), the
production function is extended to incorporate material inputs and deﬁned over sales, rather than value added.
In cases where a signiﬁcant portion of variable cost is attributed to intermediate inputs, their omission would
cause an upward bias in the mark-up estimates. Moreover, as pointed out by Basu and Fernald (1997), value
added is a problematic proxy for output in the absence of perfect competition.
7Assuming Cournot behavior in imperfectly competitive product markets, the partial derivatives






























, where N = L,M,K (3)
Market power enables ﬁrms to set the value of each input’s marginal product, Pjt(∂Y/∂N)ijt,
above the respective factor cost PNjt. Retaining a general formulation for the production
function’s degree of homogeneity, the inputs’ shares in total revenue sum to (γ/µ), where
γ – the scale parameter – does not necessarily equal one.6 Denoting logarithmic diﬀerences
with lower case letters, substituting for the partial derivatives and rearranging terms yields an
extended version of the method pioneered by Hall (1988):









While this variant of the original methodology allows separating the mark-up and scale coef-
ﬁcients, it does not avoid the inherent endogeneity problem. Proper estimation of equation 4
depends on the availability of suitable instrumental variables to address the correlation between
unobservable productivity shocks and input choices. As suggested by Levinsohn (1993), ﬁxed
eﬀects estimation could be used if the nature of the endogeneity is assumed to be constant over
time. In turn, Roeger (1995) applies Hall’s reasoning to the corresponding cost function and
uses the interaction of the primal and dual approaches to derive a testable equation in nominal
terms. Firm i minimizes cost according to:
C (PLjt,PMjt,PKjt,Yijt,Aijt) = min
L,M,K
n
(PLLi + PMMi + PKKi)jt | AijtF (Lijt,Mijt,Kijt) = Yijt
o
(5)
The linear cost function is homogeneous of degree 1 in Lijt,Mijt and Kijt and can be expressed
in terms of unit cost as Z(PLjt,PMjt,PKjt) = C(PLjt,PMjt,PKjt,1). As F(.) is homogeneous of
degree γ in the respective factor inputs, C(.) is homogeneous of degree 1





















5Likewise, the ﬁrst-order conditions for cost minimization imply (∂Y/∂N)ijt = PN/λ. By the Envelope
Theorem λ = (∂C/∂Y )ijt, the marginal cost of production. Thus, (∂Y/∂N)ijt = µijt(PN/P)jt









Y = a+b+c = γ.









































Taking the diﬀerence between the respective movements in output price and in marginal cost,
and substituting for the technological change term in equation 4, we obtain a convenient ex-
pression in nominal values:7
(dyi + dp − dki − dpK)jt =
µijt
γijt
[αLi (dli + dpL − dki − dpK) + αMi (dmi + dpM − dki − dpK)]jt (8)
It is straightforward to derive the equivalent expression in terms of the Lerner index, (1−γ/µ),
as in Roeger (1995). Denoting the left-hand side of equation 8 as dq and the right-hand side as
dx, we obtain a simple testable equation, which we extend with additional interaction terms to
study the eﬀects of trade and antitrust regimes:
dqijt = β1dxijt + β2dxijt × IMPjt + β3dxijt × ATRct + β4dxijt × GRWct + τi + ijt (9)
As the productivity shocks are eliminated by substitution in the interaction of the primal and
dual approaches, a non-zero error term in equation 9 would capture measurement error that
is likely to stem from inadequate accounting for the inputs’ true utilization levels. To assess
the eﬀects of trade and competition policy reforms on ﬁrms’ price-cost margins, we interact
dx with sector-level data on tariﬀ protection, IMPjt, and country-level measures of antitrust
enforcement, ATRct. Mindful of the diﬃculty to comprehensively quantify multi-dimensional
import and antitrust regimes, we use two alternative proxies for each policy instrument. Tariﬀ
protection is computed at the four-digit level of NACE industrial classiﬁcation and is reﬂected
by applied MFN rates and trade-weighted actual duties. Competition policy implementation is
proxied by the number of ﬁnal instance decisions delivered by the respective national authorities
and an index developed by the EBRD. The alternative import protection and antitrust variables
are included separately and in respective combinations in equation 9 to capture any diﬀerences
between the primal and dual productivity decompositions that are not explained by market
power. Real GDP growth is included as an additional interaction term to account for cyclical
eﬀects.8 Time-invariant ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, such as managers’ abilities or sunk costs,
7The derivation of equations 7 and 8 is underpinned by the assumption that µ and γ remain constant within
the period of diﬀerentiation. See Joergensen and Hylleberg (1998) for a discussion and an alternative derivation
using the deﬁnition of average mark-up. A comparative analysis of the primal and dual approaches is presented
in Kee (2004).
8For conciseness, we do not report the results from the regressions using individual interaction terms. The
point estimates are qualitatively the same.
9are captured by τi. Finally, we also include industry and year ﬁxed eﬀects to control for
unobserved shocks and shifts over time.
A number of critical considerations regarding our methodology are in order. An important
tradeoﬀ between the approaches of Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) is the ability to estimate
returns to scale directly versus minimizing endogeneity issues and measurement bias, respec-
tively. Estimating mark-ups with the former method is hindered by data requirements that
become virtually unattainable at a higher level of sectoral disaggregation. Besides appropriate
deﬂators for output, capital and materials, one needs to ﬁnd suitable instruments to address the
endogeneity resulting from potential correlation between unobserved demand or productivity
shocks and the individual ﬁrm’s input choices. Considerable ﬁrm heterogeneity within a single
sector would imply a lot of noise when aggregate price indexes and instruments are applied
to accounting ﬁgures. By introducing a cost-based expression for the unobservable technolog-
ical change, Roeger (1995) avoids the problem of inadequate instruments and overcomes the
issue of ﬁnding good deﬂators.9 Clearly, ignoring the presence of increasing (decreasing) re-
turns to scale would lead to a downward (upward) bias in the mark-up estimates. However,
any attempt to compute the inﬂuence of non-constant returns to scale would raise additional
questions regarding the appropriate functional form and estimation technique.10 As long as the
mark-up estimates are consistently biased, the corresponding intertemporal relationship should
be unaﬀected and would allow us to adequately capture the impact of import protection and
antitrust enforcement. This amounts to making the assumption that over the studied period
companies did not experience signiﬁcant downsizing or rapid growth. For empirical tractabil-
ity, the literature on mark-up estimation typically assumes that ﬁrms within the same industry
face identical productivity shocks to inputs and apply the same mark-up, which is constant in
a given period. How reasonable these assumptions are depends crucially on the exact nature
of the panel data set and the hypotheses tested. Finally, a shortcoming of the data derived
from ﬁnancial statements of multi-product ﬁrms, a considerable portion of our sample, is the
inability to disentangle ﬁgures corresponding to individual products. Therefore, we must map
product-level tariﬀs into the respective four-digit NACE industries and study more broadly
deﬁned structures than what is typically likely to qualify as the relevant market.
9However, the transformation of book value capital ﬁgures into current replacement cost implies recourse to
an aggregate price index for both approaches. This issue is present in all estimations based on accounting data.
10Dobrinsky et al. (2004) ﬁnd evidence of nearly constant returns to scale in Bulgarian and Hungarian
manufacturing over the period 1995-2001, but caution that ﬁrm heterogeneity with respect to production scale
may lead to important bias under the assumption of a uniform mark-up for a group of ﬁrms.
10Data and Measurement Issues
Data
Standardized annual company accounts were obtained from the Amadeus database maintained
by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. This unique pan-European dataset constitutes a
compendium of harmonized ﬁnancial statements, based on registered ﬁlings with the respective
national statistical oﬃces. We constrain our sample to the unconsolidated accounts of manu-
facturing ﬁrms in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the
Slovak Republic. The available data constitute an unbalanced panel of 25,267 predominantly
large and medium-sized enterprises spanning the period 1998-2002, after diﬀerencing. Summary
statistics of the variables derived from company accounts are reported in table 2.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
BG CZ EE HU PL SI SK
Turnover 1008.040 12871.830 975.407 7536.222 14676.910 2954.916 14635.760
(9975.009) (52379.480) (3311.844) (74867.650) (54669.980) (19586.770) (28334.820)
Tangible Fixed Assets 483.883 4722.303 269.682 1816.218 4862.251 1346.853 6665.959
(4455.636) (32010.090) (1323.589) (16085.500) (20635.850) (7271.496) (18099.540)
Material Costs 533.260 10182.330 648.013 5268.212 6748.621 2106.955 12471.000
(7347.057) (66478.150) (2372.941) (61147.240) (27036.970) (16379.920) (22537.900)
Personnel Costs 144.391 2116.487 137.042 1247.863 1460.415 570.538 1809.094
(972.647) (38189.130) (386.322) (38835.340) (2671.714) (2562.975) (2530.738)
Employees 73 291 33 146 241 164 522
(262.714) (505.658) (88.305) (639.656) (353.180) (367.666) (674.152)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; values expressed in thousands of dollars.
There is notable cross-country variation in average ﬁrm size, as captured by the number
of employees. The considerably higher ﬁgure for the Slovak Republic indicates a certain sam-
pling bias toward the largest ﬁrms in this country. Nevertheless, given the customs union with
the Czech Republic and the independent antitrust enforcement in the two countries, including
these ﬁrms would facilitate capturing the eﬀect of competition policy implementation.11 While
diﬀerences across countries are highlighted by the other variables as well, we must keep in mind
the considerable inter and intra-industry heterogeneity that the average ﬁgures conceal. The
dataset is fairly representative of industrial activity in the studied countries. A comparison
with aggregate statistics on sales and personnel costs in manufacturing available from Euro-
11In fact, omitting Slovak ﬁrms from our cross-country regressions did not alter the estimates in a signiﬁcant
way.
11stat suggests that our data cover approximately 70 per cent of the respective total ﬁgures for
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Only for the Slovak
Republic representation is in the range of 20 per cent of total manufacturing turnover and
personnel costs.
Product-level data on trade ﬂows and applied customs tariﬀs, both on MFN basis and
under preferential agreements, at six-digit HS level of disaggregation were obtained from the
COMTRADE and WITS databases, respectively. The corresponding average import protec-
tion measures at four-digit NACE rev 1.1 level were computed using a detailed concordance
between the two classiﬁcations available from Eurostat. In quantifying import barriers, we
face a tradeoﬀ between accounting for the preferential treatment of certain trading partners
and minimizing bias. While MFN rates can be largely considered as exogenous, they do not
capture the considerable volume of trade taking place at lower levels of protection across the
studied countries. Trade-weighted tariﬀs reﬂect the preferential customs duties enforced under
free trade agreements, using bilateral imports’ share in total imports as respective weights.
However, even in the short run trade ﬂows are decisively inﬂuenced by the level of preferences
granted and will produce a somewhat biased weighting. Accordingly, concurrent MFN and
preferential tariﬀ reductions would be reﬂected in sharper intertemporal declines of the com-
puted average import barrier, whereas instances of increased protection would result in less
pronounced increases.
Data on ﬁnal instance decisions, covering cases of restrictive agreements, abuse of domi-
nance and concentration authorizations, were taken from the respective antitrust authorities’
annual reports. To reﬂect diﬀerences in economy size among the studied countries, the ﬁgures
were scaled by the total number of domestic ﬁrms (in manufacturing, services, trade, construc-
tion and utilities) reported by Eurostat for the year 2000. As a purely quantitative measure
of enforcement activity, the number of decisions would not capture well the diﬀerences across
antitrust legislations or the seriousness of investigated anticompetitive practices.12 The alterna-
tive proxy for competition policy is an index developed by the EBRD, which takes into account
both the legal and enforcement dimensions. The ranking of antitrust regimes is done on the
basis of legislation, institutional framework, enforcement actions and eﬀorts to reduce barriers
to entry and promote a competitive environment. While the methodology is not described in
detail, suggesting a possible degree of subjectivity in the assessment, the evolution of national
competition policy frameworks in our sample is reported to reﬂect improved focus on market
12While the general presumption is that a stricter antitrust regime is associated with a higher number of
decisions, the measure’s interpretation remains somewhat problematic. A high quality of enforcement could be
associated with more parsimonious decision-making, notably as a consequence of legislative ﬁne-tuning.
12power, break-up of dominant conglomerates and reduction of entry restrictions. Unfortunately,
the limited time variation of the index restricts its use to cross-country panel regressions.
Measurement Issues
The use of nominal values, rather than deﬂated ones, oﬀers the advantage of avoiding poor
proxies for the actual price levels of inputs and output. Nevertheless, some measurement error
is inevitable, as company accounts data do not accurately reﬂect true factor utilization. Specif-
ically, ﬂuctuations in the average work time per employee or per physical capital employed are
inadequately captured in ﬁnancial statements. Besides actual ﬂows of labor and capital ser-
vices, ideally, we should also account for variations in the respective inputs’ quality. Inaccurate
measurement of true factor utilization will result in a cyclical component in the error term.
To control for the cyclical impact in the regression, we introduce time ﬁxed eﬀects and the
growth rate of GDP as an additional macroeconomic variable capturing variations in demand.
Conventional accounting principles also deviate from economic reasoning in the treatment of
durable capital inputs acquired by the ﬁrm. Although ﬁnancial accounts oﬀer the possibility
to distribute the purchase cost of an asset throughout its useful life, the interest tied up in
the acquisition typically is not recognized as a true economic cost. Similarly, any anticipated
change in purchase price over the respective period is not reﬂected in the input’s recorded
value. Accordingly, we follow established practice in the literature and transform the book
value of tangible ﬁxed assets into the corresponding ﬁgure at current replacement cost, using a
simpliﬁed rental price of capital:
PK = (rct + δt) × Pct
Pct is the country-level producer price index of industrial output taken from WIIW. Data on
the real annual deposit rates in each country, rct, were obtained from the IFS database. The
annual depreciation rate is captured by δt. In constructing the user cost of capital, we inevitably
face practical problems with the measurement of the three components: depreciation, tied-up
interest and anticipated price change. Among the various rates of return suggested in the
literature on user cost calculation, the deposit rate stands out as best suited for transitional
economies with underdeveloped credit and securities markets. Moreover, a safe rate of return,
such as that of government bonds, was unavailable in a consistent formulation for all countries.
Similarly, although an index of investment goods prices may seem more appropriate for our
purposes, inadequate country coverage severely constrained our choice. Due to data limitations
and diﬀerent accounting conventions regarding the useful lives of assets, we also assumed a
13uniform depreciation rate of 10% for all ﬁrms. Alternative values for the depreciation rate
produced qualitatively similar results.
Results
To get a general idea of the two policy regimes’ quantitative eﬀects, we compute the average
price-cost margins corresponding to the top and bottom quartiles of the relevant proxies. The
lowest levels of import protection, both in MFN and trade-weighted terms, are associated
with a mark-up of 6.3 percent. The reciprocal estimates at the tariﬀ peaks are 19.6 and 14.3
percent, respectively. The average mark-ups at low levels of antitrust enforcement, as reﬂected
by the number of ﬁnal instance decisions and the EBRD index, stand at 6.1 and and 6.9
percent. However, due to insuﬃcient observations at the lower quartile of the latter measure,
the two sub-samples for that variable were deﬁned at the median. Signiﬁcant enforcement
activity ensures pricing slightly below marginal cost in the case of ﬁnal rulings, whereas the
corresponding ﬁgure for the upper half of the EBRD ranking is 5.8 percent. In absolute terms,
the diﬀerence between average mark-ups at the top and bottom quartiles is most pronounced
for the number of decisions (17%), followed by that corresponding to the MFN tariﬀ (13.3%).
Unfortunately, the underlying distribution with respect to the EBRD index does not allow a
similar comparison of the eﬀects’ magnitude. We also test for the signiﬁcance of enacting major
legislative amendments with regard to competition policy in the studied countries. Our ﬁndings
indicate that, on average, price-cost margins have decreased by nearly 6 percent following the
wave of improvements to the relevant national legal frameworks.
Pooling ﬁrms across countries and industries, we test for the overall eﬀects of tariﬀ protec-
tion and competition policy implementation on price-cost margins, as captured by the possible
pairs of alternative variables. Controls for industry-speciﬁc and country-speciﬁc diﬀerences in
mark-ups, as well as time ﬁxed eﬀects, are also incorporated in the regression. Point estimates
for the respective combinations of alternative proxies are reported in table 3 along with the cor-
responding average eﬀects. The estimation results suggest that mark-ups increase with higher
import barriers and decrease with more intensive antitrust enforcement. In terms of magnitude,
the distinct eﬀects on ﬁrms’ price-cost margins must be computed as the product of the point
estimate and a certain value of the corresponding interaction variable. Using sample means of
the particular proxies, a natural choice for an impact assessment, we ﬁnd that, on average, the
disciplining eﬀect of competition policy implementation more than oﬀsets the leeway aﬀorded
by tariﬀ protection.13 This result largely holds at the respective extreme values, as well. The
13As an additional robustness check, we computed the crude mark-up observed directly from company ac-
14Table 3: Estimated Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EBRD index — — -0.129 -0.136
(0.045)*** (0.045)***
Final decisions -0.051 -0.053 — —
(0.025)* (0.025)**
Antitrust Eﬀect -.040 -.042 -0.083 -0.088
MFN tariﬀ 0.192 — 0.192 —
(0.064)*** (0.063)***
Trade-weighted tariﬀ — 0.104 — 0.112
(0.068)* (0.070)*
Import Barrier Eﬀect 0.029 0.006 0.029 0.006
4GDP -0.315 -0.311 -0.362 -0.362
(0.098)*** (0.097)*** (0.103)*** (0.103)***
Cyclical Eﬀect 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.009
R2 0.687 0.687 0.687 0.687
Observations 62784 62784 62784 62784
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** indicate
signiﬁcance at 10/5/1 per cent, respectively. Eﬀects reported at
sample means of the relevant interaction terms.
only exception is at the maxima where the eﬀect of peak MFN rates exceeds that of antitrust
enforcement, as reﬂected by both proxies. The joint signiﬁcance of import and antitrust regimes
suggests that trade liberalization alone may not create suﬃcient conditions for the containment
and prevention of market power abuses in the process of economic transformation. As our study
covers predominantly small economies, it is noteworthy that barriers to trade do not seem to
dominate the importance of competition policy in inﬂuencing the pricing behavior of domestic
ﬁrms. Trade liberalization over the studied period is captured by both the MFN and trade-
weighted tariﬀ variables – the respective declines in mean duties of 3.8 and 4.5 per cent suggest
price-cost margin reductions of 0.7 and 0.5 per cent. Our estimates highlight that MFN import
duties have a comparatively larger eﬀect than the trade-weighted counterpart. In this respect,
we must note that the latter variable reﬂects the presence of preferential rates and, due to the
weighting, is susceptible to a downward bias in the measurement of import protection changes
over time. Similarly, the impact of antitrust enforcement estimated using the EBRD index is
larger than that suggested by the number of ﬁnal instance decisions. This is consistent with the
counts and regressed it on the same variables. The results are qualitatively analogous. Hausman tests strongly
supported the appropriateness of ﬁxed eﬀects estimation in all speciﬁcations. We also controlled for possi-
ble endogeneity of antitrust enforcement activity to observed price-cost margins. A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
conﬁrmed that the number of ﬁnal instance decisions can be treated as exogenous.
15fact that qualitative aspects of the relevant national authorities’ activities during the studied
period, such as eﬀective reduction of entry barriers and competition advocacy, presumably are
better reﬂected in the former variable.
Table 4: Directional Prevalence of Trade
Import-intensive Export-oriented Import-intensive Export-oriented
EBRD index — — — — -0.129 -0.147 -0.086 -0.085
(0.062)** (0.061)** (0.07) (0.071)
Final decisions -0.082 -0.085 -0.034 -0.035 — — — —
(0.037)** (0.037)** (0.027) (0.027)
Antitrust Eﬀect -0.068 -0.071 -0.024 -0.025 -0.08 -0.091 -0.055 -0.054
MFN tariﬀ 0.382 — 0.168 — 0.37 — 0.166 —
(0.196)* (0.073)** (0.192)* (0.072)**
Trade-weighted tariﬀ — 0.460 — -0.046 — 0.463 — -0.047
(0.118)*** (0.135) (0.124)*** (0.136)
Import Barrier Eﬀect 0.049 0.021 0.027 -0.003 0.047 0.021 0.027 -0.003
4GDP -0.410 -0.392 -0.383 -0.393 -0.43 -0.426 -0.42 -0.428
(0.110)*** (0.103)*** (0.140)** (0.134)*** (0.098)*** (0.092)*** (0.164)** (0.160)**
Cyclical Eﬀect 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.011 0.01 0.01
R2 0.689 0.689 0.69 0.69 0.689 0.689 0.69 0.69
Observations 19507 19507 20148 20148 19507 19507 20148 20148
Firms 7976 7976 7907 7907 7976 7976 7907 7907
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** indicate signiﬁcance at 10/5/1 per cent, respectively.
Eﬀects reported at sample means of the relevant interaction terms.
For further insights on the role played by trade in the shaping of competitive markets, we
split the sample according to the directional prevalence of actual ﬂows in the ﬁve-year period.
Our approach is motivated by endogeneity issues, as both import penetration and export ﬁg-
ures are likely to be correlated with domestic productivity or demand shocks. The trade ﬂows
are measured in quantity terms in order to avoid any additional bias stemming from diﬀerences
in price levels. Accordingly, we deﬁne four-digit NACE industries as import-intensive if the
exports to imports ratio does not exceed 0.85 in any single year within the examined timespan.
To qualify a manufacturing sector as export-oriented, its corresponding ratio must be no less
than 1.15 throughout the period.14 The third category, characterized by very similar export
and import ﬂows, is likely to reﬂect strong re-exports or a high degree of product diﬀeren-
tiation. Only the EBRD proxy for antitrust enforcement produced a statistically signiﬁcant
point estimate from this sub-sample. By and large, the results shown in table 4 conﬁrm that
14We also experimented with a larger sample, including sectors that crossed the thresholds during the studied
period, as well as with a cutoﬀ at 1. The results were qualitatively analogous – the estimated mean eﬀects were
only marginally lower.
16import tariﬀ protection has a positive impact on mark-ups, whereas competition policy exerts a
depressing eﬀect of larger magnitude. The comparative diﬀerences between estimates obtained
using alternative proxies are also maintained. In terms of statistical signiﬁcance, the pricing
behavior of ﬁrms in export-oriented industries appears fairly unaﬀected by either policy instru-
ment. Only MFN tariﬀ barriers are found to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on price-cost margins in
sectors that are successfully competing abroad. Incidentally, this is the only instance where the
impact of import protection exceeds in magnitude that of antitrust enforcement, as reﬂected by
the number of ﬁnal instance decisions. Considering the predominantly regional focus of trade
ﬂows and preferences granted, this result may suggest some potential for further enhancing
competitive pressure, albeit modestly, through multilateral liberalization. In this respect, it is
important to note the limitations of eﬀorts to discipline the pricing behavior of internationally
competitive ﬁrms.
Table 5: Dynamic Eﬀects of Antitrust Enforcement
Full Sample Import-intensive Export-oriented
Final decisions(t−1) -0.047 -0.048 -0.107 -0.110 -0.010 -0.010
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.021) (0.021)
Antitrust Eﬀect -0.034 -0.034 -0.080 -0.082 -0.006 -0.006
MFN tariﬀ 0.193 — 0.380 — 0.166 —
(0.063)*** (0.193)* (0.072)**
Trade-weighted tariﬀ — 0.101 — 0.449 — -0.053
(0.067)* (0.117)*** (0.130)
Import Barrier Eﬀect 0.029 0.006 0.049 0.021 0.027 -0.004
4GDP -0.240 -0.234 -0.248 -0.226 -0.339 -0.347
(0.092)** (0.091)** (0.091)** (0.085)** (0.142)** (0.135)**
Cyclical Eﬀect 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.008
R2 0.687 0.687 0.690 0.689 0.690 0.690
Observations 62784 62784 19507 19507 20148 20148
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** indicate signiﬁcance at 10/5/1
per cent, respectively. Eﬀects reported at sample means of the relevant interaction
terms.
As antitrust investigations and appeals could span over considerable periods of time, it is a
priori unclear whether ﬁrms would be forward or backward looking with respect to ﬁnal rulings,
in adjusting their pricing behavior. Accordingly, we test for the presence of an intertemporal
signaling eﬀect of competition policy enforcement in both directions, using the number of ﬁnal
instance decisions with a one-year lead and lag, respectively. Our results lend strong support to
the hypothesis of ex post correction of price-cost margins, indicating that, in general, the mere
17launching of proceedings is not perceived as a viable threat.15 The point estimates obtained
with lagged ﬁgures are highly signiﬁcant, both for the full sample and the import-competing
subset, whereas the forward-looking counterparts are insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. In terms
of magnitude, while the average antitrust eﬀect suggested by the entire sample is slightly below
the one observed in the contemporaneous case, we ﬁnd a more pronounced impact in import-
intensive sectors. The ﬁndings for export-oriented industries are also conﬁrmed, notably the
lack of statistically signiﬁcant relationship to the number of decisions and the dominance of
MFN import barriers’ impact over antitrust enforcement activity.
We must also note that using the EBRD index as an explanatory variable may impose an
unrealistic restriction on the regression. Being a ranking of antitrust enforcement at uniform
increments, such a regressor would introduce an implicit assumption of unvarying diﬀerence
across mark-ups corresponding to adjacent thresholds. In reality, there is no reason to expect
that, on average, the pricing behavior of ﬁrms would alter by identical margins for each level
upgrade attained by national competition policy regimes.
Table 6: Threshold Eﬀects
Full Sample Import-intensive Export-oriented Imports ≈ Exports
EBRD Threshold 1 -0.021 -0.023 -0.033 -0.039 -0.015 -0.015 -0.021 -0.018
(0.059) (0.059) (0.106) (0.106) (0.078) (0.077) (0.104) (0.102)
EBRD Threshold 2 -0.047 -0.049 -0.049 -0.056 -0.033 -0.032 -0.066 -0.067
(0.020)** (0.020)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.027) (0.027) (0.034)* (0.033)*
EBRD Threshold 3 -0.167 -0.161 0.000 0.006 0.257 0.313 -0.295 -0.293
(0.077)** (0.077)** (0.113) (0.111) (0.073)*** (0.084)*** (0.156)** (0.156)**
MFN tariﬀ 0.189 — 0.365 — 0.166 — 0.054 —
(0.062)*** (0.192)* (0.073)** (0.098)
Trade-weighted tariﬀ — 0.112 — 0.454 — -0.038 — 0.034
(0.07) (0.121)*** (0.141) (0.119)
Import Barrier Eﬀect 0.028 0.006 0.047 0.021 0.027 -0.003 0.009 0.002
4GDP -0.355 -0.353 -0.423 -0.421 -0.412 -0.418 -0.245 -0.245
(0.111)*** (0.112)*** (0.107)*** (0.103)*** (0.172)** (0.170)** (0.152) (0.153)
Cyclical Eﬀect 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.01 0.005 0.005
R2 0.688 0.688 0.69 0.689 0.69 0.69 0.686 0.687
Observations 62784 62784 19507 19507 20148 20148 23129 23129
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** indicate signiﬁcance at 10/5/1 per cent, respectively.
A more ﬂexible regression, allowing for asymmetrical threshold eﬀects, reveals that such an
assumption is indeed inaccurate. We ﬁnd that a move from the lowest of the four thresholds in
15This could also reﬂect a learning process within the respective competition authorities, resulting in more
focused investigations at a later stage.
18our sample to the second is not associated with a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in price-cost
margins. Nevertheless, ﬁrms’ pricing behavior is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by further improvements
in antitrust enforcement. Evolving on to the third and fourth levels of competition policy
eﬀectiveness reduces mark-ups by about 5 and 16 per cent, respectively. An interesting pattern
emerges from the two extreme subsets deﬁned by the exports to imports ratio, while results for
the intermediate case are broadly in line with those for the full sample. Estimates for the import-
competing category conﬁrm that a degree of maturity corresponding to the third threshold is
associated with a depressing impact on price-cost margins, but indicate no change when the
next level is reached. By contrast, regressions based on the export-oriented subset yield a
positive and statistically signiﬁcant estimate for the marginal eﬀect of the highest threshold.
A plausible explanation for this result may be that internationally competitive ﬁrms beneﬁt
from enhanced competition in their material input markets, while remaining less susceptible to
indirect threats of strengthened antitrust enforcement. Our ﬁndings lend some support to the
premise that competition rules should be aligned to domestic economic realities. The robust
responsiveness of import-competing ﬁrms’ mark-ups to more competitive conditions suggests
that a direct comprehensive transposition of European standards in antitrust legislation from
the outset of transition might have hampered enterprise restructuring and development in the
studied economies. In this respect, the delayed harmonization of national legislations with the
Community blueprint in the area of state aid, observed in all countries, may not be entirely
unjustiﬁed.
Country-speciﬁc mark-up estimates for each manufacturing sector with suﬃcient observa-
tions are reported in table 7. There is notable variation across countries, as well as across
industries. The price-cost margins compare favorably with estimates reported in earlier stud-
ies. Using a sample of Bulgarian manufacturing ﬁrms between 1994 and 1998, Konings et al.
(2005) compute mark-ups in the range of 20 to 40 percent and Dobrinsky et al. (2004) docu-
ment margins of comparable magnitude for Bulgaria and Hungary over the period 1995-2001.
The pairwise correlation across sectoral price-cost margins is relatively low, indicating that do-
mestic market conditions have a non-negligible impact on ﬁrms’ pricing behavior. Incidentally,
the strongest (and statistically signiﬁcant) systematic relationships are observed between the
mark-up estimates for Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia. The respective rank correlations for the
pairs Bulgaria–Hungary, Bulgaria–Slovenia and Hungary–Slovenia are 0.378, 0.515 and 0.436.
It may not be unrealistic to attribute these ﬁgures to the similar levels of import protection,
as well as the similar positions of Bulgaria and Slovenia in the EBRD ranking of antitrust
enforcement regimes.
Notwithstanding the harmonization of balance sheet entries in the Amadeus database, dif-
19Table 7: Price-Cost Margins by Sector
NACE Code BG CZ EE HU PL SI SK
15 Food and beverages 5*** 6.7*** 14.4*** 28*** 23.1*** 5.4*** 0.5
17 Textiles 24.9*** 6.7*** 25*** 49.9*** 24.3*** 6.8*** 30.4***
18 Wearing apparel; fur 36.4*** 8.4*** 10.5*** 26.4*** 61.9*** 12.5*** —
19 Leather, luggage and footwear 22.9*** 11.7** 36.6*** 43.9** 26.7*** 5.6*** 4.3
20 Wood, straw and plaiting materials 15.2*** 24*** 6.6*** 25.7*** 23.4*** 7.2*** —
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 11.6* 2.9*** 50.9*** 48.7*** — 8.7*** 32.7***
22 Publishing, printing and media 51.3*** 22.1*** 9.3*** 24.4*** 55.2*** 11.8* 36.7***
23 Coke, reﬁned petroleum products, nuclear fuel 31.3*** 18.4*** — 13.8** — 5.7*** —
24 Chemicals and chemical products 27.2*** 18.6*** 55.4*** 77.9*** 50.6*** 4.4*** 6.6
25 Rubber and plastic products 19.1*** 18.6*** 20.1*** 57.2*** 32.5*** 14.9*** 39.3**
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 22.4*** 22.4*** 26.2*** 20.6*** 63.2** 13.5** 35.8***
27 Basic metals 27.7*** 34*** 17.1*** 40** 37.2*** 15.7** —
28 Fabricated metal products 25*** 6.1*** 20.1*** 32.3*** 64.1** 13.1** 31.2*
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 24.8*** 11.2** 21.4*** 43.7*** 41.3*** 16.1*** —
30 Oﬃce machinery and computers 14.1*** 67.1*** 28.3*** 21*** 31.4*** 5.9*** —
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 31*** 6.6*** 5.1*** 41.8*** 24.4*** 10.5*** 13.7
32 Radio, TV, and communication equipment 35.2*** 14.8*** 4.1*** 73.3*** 61.7** 7.9*** 31.7**
33 Medical, precision, and optical instruments 58.8*** 31.7*** 17.7*** 70.1*** 56.9*** 9.2*** —
34 Motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers 34.1*** 23.2*** 1*** 29.7*** 30.8** 12.7** 67.6***
35 Other transport equipment 28.8*** — 31.7*** — 27.5*** 9*** 29.5
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 15.2*** 3.9* 10.9*** 11*** 34.7*** 12.6*** 69.1***
Note: Reported values correspond to (P − MC)/MC. */**/*** indicate signiﬁcance at 10/5/1 per cent,
respectively.
ferences in reporting requirements and accounting conventions are likely to result in data id-
iosyncrasies across countries. To verify the robustness of the estimated relationships between
price-cost margins and national import and antitrust regimes, we pool manufacturing ﬁrms in
country-speciﬁc panels and replicate the regression on the separate sub-samples. Unfortunately,
we cannot use the EBRD index in this context due to its limited variation over time.
The results are broadly in line with the ﬁndings based on the cross-country panel. A nega-
tive relationship between ﬁrms’ mark-ups and the number of ﬁnal instance decisions delivered
by the national antitrust authorities is observed for each country, albeit statistically signiﬁcant
only in the case of Bulgaria and Hungary. On the whole, price-cost margins are positively
related to import duties, with a more pronounced eﬀect in the case of MFN tariﬀs. An interest-
ing exception is observed in the case of Estonia where the estimated impact of trade-weighted
rates, computed at the sample mean, exceeds in magnitude its counterpart obtained using MFN
ﬁgures. This is consistent with the fact that in the presence of preferential trade agreements,
by construct, the former variable attenuates a tariﬀ barrier increase and overrates a respective
20Table 8: Estimated Eﬀects by Country
BG CZ EE HU PL SI SK
Final decisions -1.484 -1.008 -0.067 -0.168 -0.243 -0.086 -0.075
(0.700)** (1.832) (0.054) (0.093)* (4.105) (0.115) (0.11)
Antitrust Eﬀect -0.299 -0.179 -0.14 -0.394 -0.037 -0.023 -0.42
MFN tariﬀ 0.512 0.307 0.084 0.465 0.221 0.042 1.944
(0.195)** (0.156)* (0.032)** (0.137)*** (0.127)* (0.143) (0.514)***
Import Barrier Eﬀect 0.109 0.019 0.001 0.055 0.08 0.005 0.147
4GDP 0.252 0.563 -0.103 -0.923 1.908 0.068 1.57
(0.553) (1.304) (0.42) (0.353)** (2.128) (0.228) (0.912)
Cyclical Eﬀect -0.004 -0.0005 -0.001 0.04 0.0004 -0.005 -0.028
R2 0.538 0.620 0.576 0.635 0.558 0.781 0.548
Final decisions -1.263 -1.061 -0.069 -0.161 -0.107 -0.093 -0.048
(0.807)* (1.843) (0.054) (0.091)* (4.08) (0.119) (0.115)
Antitrust Eﬀect -0.255 -0.188 -0.144 -0.378 -0.016 -0.024 -0.269
Trade-weighted tariﬀ 0.048 0.211 2.952 0.546 0.567 0.017 -0.296
(0.15) (0.142) (0.659)*** (0.049)*** (0.195)*** (0.099) (0.891)
Import Barrier Eﬀect 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.03 0.038 0.0004 -0.007
4GDP 0.193 0.602 -0.11 -0.87 1.815 0.058 1.961
(0.555) (1.312) (0.42) (0.359)** (2.102) (0.231) (0.960)
Cyclical Eﬀect -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.038 0.0004 -0.004 -0.034
R2 0.536 0.620 0.575 0.635 0.558 0.781 0.542
Observations 20270 8000 5959 10082 5641 12340 441
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** indicate signiﬁcance at 10/5/1 per
cent, respectively. Eﬀects reported at sample means of the relevant interaction terms.
decline. Over the studied period, Estonia introduced non-zero MFN duties on a number of
products concentrated solely in the food processing industry. Accordingly, the import barrier
eﬀect estimated on the basis of this variable is the lowest across all countries. The negative
relationship obtained using trade-weighted duties for the Slovak Republic is probably due to
the very limited number of observations. Unfortunately, while the customs union between the
Czech and the Slovak Republics makes an interesting case for investigation, the considerable
discrepancy in sample sizes does not allow us to draw any meaningful conclusions. Despite am-
ple empirical evidence that price-cost margins vary over the business cycle, there is a deﬁciency
of sound theoretical predictions regarding the direction of the mark-up’s variation. While, for
the most part, our country-speciﬁc estimates suggest a positive relationship to the business cy-
cle, only the counter-cyclical results are statistically signiﬁcant and conﬁrm the earlier ﬁndings
based on the cross-country panel.
21Conclusion
This paper draws on a rich ﬁrm-level dataset to analyze the role and interaction of trade and
competition policies in the shaping of competitive markets across Central and Eastern Europe.
Using alternative proxies, we ﬁnd that, on average, tariﬀ protection has a positive eﬀect on
mark-ups, whereas antitrust enforcement has a depressing impact of larger magnitude. As our
study covers mostly small economies, it is noteworthy that barriers to trade do not seem to
dominate the importance of competition policy in inﬂuencing the pricing behavior of domestic
ﬁrms. The joint signiﬁcance of import and antitrust regimes suggests that trade liberalization
alone may not create suﬃcient conditions for the containment and prevention of market power
abuses in the process of economic transformation. We must also recognize the limitations
of eﬀorts to discipline the pricing behavior of internationally competitive ﬁrms, consistently
highlighted in our results.
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Table 9: Trade Agreements – Chronology
Partners Entry into force Type Partners Entry into force Type
CZ SK EC 01/03/1992 FTA Slovenia Lithuania 01/03/1997 FTA
Hungary EC 01/03/1992 FTA CZ SK Lithuania 01/07/1997 FTA
Poland EC 01/03/1992 FTA CEFTA (CZ, HU, PL, SK, SI, RO) 01/07/1997 RTA
CZ SK EFTA 01/07/1992 FTA Slovenia Croatia 01/01/1998 FTA
CEFTA (CZ, HU, PL, SK) 01/03/1993 RTA Hungary Israel 01/02/1998 FTA
Bulgaria EFTA 01/07/1993 FTA Poland Israel 01/03/1998 FTA
Hungary EFTA 01/10/1993 FTA Hungary Turkey 01/04/1998 FTA
Poland EFTA 15/11/1993 FTA Poland Latvia 01/04/1998 FTA
Bulgaria EC 31/12/1993 FTA Estonia Turkey 01/06/1998 FTA
BAFTA (EE, LV, LT) 01/04/1994 RTA CZ SK Turkey 01/09/1998 FTA
Estonia EC 01/01/1995 FTA Slovenia Israel 01/09/1998 FTA
CZ SK WTO 01/01/1995 MTS Estonia Faroe Islands 01/12/1998 FTA
Hungary WTO 01/01/1995 MTS CEFTA (CZ, HU, PL, SK, SI, RO, BG) 01/01/1999 RTA
Slovenia EFTA 01/06/1995 FTA Bulgaria Turkey 01/01/1999 FTA
Poland WTO 01/07/1995 MTS Estonia Hungary 01/01/1999 FTA
Slovenia WTO 30/07/1995 MTS Poland Faroe Islands 01/06/1999 FTA
Bulgaria CZ SK 01/01/1996 FTA Poland Estonia 01/11/1999 FTA
Romania CZ SK 01/01/1996 FTA Estonia WTO 13/11/1999 MTS
CEFTA (CZ, HU, PL, SK, SI) 01/01/1996 RTA Bulgaria Macedonia. FYR 01/01/2000 FTA
Estonia Ukraine 14/03/1996 FTA Hungary Latvia 01/01/2000 FTA
Estonia EFTA 01/06/1996 FTA Hungary Lithuania 01/03/2000 FTA
Estonia CZ SK 01/07/1996 FTA Poland Turkey 01/05/2000 FTA
CZ SK Latvia 01/07/1996 FTA Slovenia Turkey 01/06/2000 FTA
Slovenia Latvia 01/08/1996 FTA Hungary Croatia 01/01/2002 FTA
Slovenia Macedonia, FYR 01/09/1996 FTA Poland Croatia 01/01/2002 FTA
Bulgaria WTO 01/12/1996 MTS CZ SK Croatia 01/01/2002 FTA
Bulgaria Slovenia 01/01/1997 FTA Bulgaria Croatia 01/01/2002 FTA
CZ SK Israel 01/01/1997 FTA Slovenia Bosnia & Herzegovina 01/01/2002 FTA
Estonia Slovenia 01/01/1997 FTA Bulgaria Israel 01/01/2002 FTA
Poland Lithuania 01/01/1997 FTA Bulgaria Estonia 01/01/2002 FTA
Slovenia EC 01/01/1997 FTA Bulgaria Lithuania 01/03/2002 FTA
Source: WTO.
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Antitrust Legislation – Chronology
Bulgaria
1998 New Law on the Protection of Competition (12 May 1998). The Commission for the Protection of Com-
petition (CPC) is given the power to impose sanctions in case of infringement of the law, as well as to
order immediate termination of the violation and restoration of the initial situation. Scope of applica-
tion extended over joint ventures, undertakings with special or exclusive rights and public authorities.
Protection of consumer interests is no longer part of the CPC’s functions. Detailed methodology for
investigation and deﬁnition of market position in the relevant market. The Ministry of Finance is em-
powered with ex post state aid monitoring (annual report and inventory), while the Commission for the
Protection of Competition is in charge of ex ante state aid control (authorizing or prohibiting aid projects
after compulsory notiﬁcation).
2001 Block exemption for certain types of vertical agreements. Methodology for the calculation of penalties
and ﬁnes. Procedural improvements to enhance administrative capacity. A notiﬁcation format, inventory
and annual report on state aid.
2002 Law on State Aid adopted. Sets out the procedural framework for state aid control along with substantive
implementing rules.
Czech Republic
2000 Block exemption for certain types of franchise agreements. The Oﬃce for the Protection of Competition
is empowered to monitor state aid. Increased transparency, both at the decision-making stage and with
respect to information, interpretation and methodology.
2001 New Act on the Protection of Competition (1 July 2001). Scope of application extended over joint
ventures, associations and special-purpose undertakings. More precise deﬁnition of material competence
and extended powers of investigation. Relevant market deﬁnition explicitly stipulates substitutability
and territory conditions. Dominance is established on the principle of market power, as an aggregate of
more criteria than the mere market share. Concept of collective dominance introduced. New method-
ology and thresholds for agreements falling under the de minimis principle, with explicit distinction
between horizontal and vertical agreements. Hardcore restrictions cannot qualify as agreements of minor
importance. Reﬁned deﬁnition and assessment methodology for concentrations, with thresholds based
on turnover. Ex ante notiﬁcation of intended concentrations required, with possible exemptions from
this rule. Leniency program and possibility for negative clearance introduced. Eight block exemption
decrees. Modiﬁed criteria for granting individual exemption-based exclusively on competition considera-
tions. Methodology for state aid assessment. Maximum timelines for issuing a decision and an extended
3-year term for imposing a ﬁne.
2002 More detailed conditions for the application of a leniency regime.
28Estonia
1998 New Competition Act (1 October 1998). Ex ante notiﬁcation of intended concentrations required (mon-
itoring without authority to block). Procedures for notiﬁcation of concentrations and for the granting of
special and exclusive rights. Possibility for block exemptions introduced. Principles and procedure for
state aid allocation.
1999 Five block exemption regulations.
2000 Two block exemption regulations. Conditions for the granting of state aid.
2001 New Competition Act (1 October 2001). Matters pertaining to unfair competition no longer within the
Competition Board’s competence. Reﬁned deﬁnition of concentration and increased notiﬁcation thresh-
olds, no longer based on a market share criterion. Introduced the authority to prohibit a concentration.
Seven block exemption regulations. Procedural rules for the granting of special or exclusive rights through
public competition. Secondary legislation on state aid introduced.
2002 Competition oﬀenses criminalized. The Competition Board is granted pre-trial investigation powers.
Three block exemption regulations. Guidelines for calculation of turnover in concentration assessment.
Hungary
1997 New Competition Act (1 January 1997). Scope of application extended over natural and legal persons
and companies without legal personality, including in case of activities carried out abroad. Provisions
relating to consumer fraud and other unfair market practices. Explicit prohibition of all anticompetitive
agreements, including vertical ones. Costs and risks of market entry and exit, ﬁnancial strength of the
undertakings, the structure of the relevant market and market shares are among the factors to be taken
into account in dominance assessment. Ex ante notiﬁcation of concentrations required, with turnover-
based thresholds. Five block exemption regulations.
1999 Three block exemption regulations.
2001 Provision that hard-core restrictions among competitors (price-ﬁxing, market allocating agreements)
cannot qualify as agreements of minor importance. Individual exemptions for anticompetitive agreements
no longer granted for an unlimited period. The deﬁnition of ‘part of an undertaking’ has been added.
Simpliﬁed deﬁnition of ‘dominant position’. Adjusted procedural deadlines and levels of disciplinary
ﬁnes. Possibility for ex ante inquiry into sectors of the economy introduced. Supply-side substitutability
explicitly mentioned in the deﬁnition of the relevant market. Possibility for conditional exemptions and
concentration authorizations. Authority to search private homes and cars with prior court authorization.
The basis of a leniency policy is established.
2002 Three block exemption regulations amended in line with EU legislation. Scope of application of the Act
on Public Procurement extended. New implementing rules for the Hungary/EC Europe Agreement.
Poland
1997 Competence extended to include consumer protection matters.
291999 Higher notiﬁcation thresholds for concentrations and new methodology for calculation of turnover. A
ﬁve-year limit for institution of proceedings in case of failure to notify a concentration.
2000 Procedural rules for investigation of monopolistic practices. Detailed requirements for notiﬁcation of
intended concentrations.
2001 New Act on Competition and Consumer Protection (April 2001). Possibility to grant individual and block
exemptions, as well as statutory exclusions for agreements of minor importance, but not for hardcore
restrictions of competition. Amended regulations enable ex ante use of rule-of-reason analysis. Higher
notiﬁcation thresholds for concentrations and a new methodology for turnover calculation. Procedure for
conducting investigations. Regulation on conducting inspections in the course of antitrust proceedings.
Framework state aid law enacted.
2002 Detailed procedure for notiﬁcation of intended concentrations. Four block exemption regulations, taking
account of new EU policies on vertical and horizontal restraints. Reﬁned territorial and material juris-
diction. Law on the conditions of admissibility and supervision of state aid for entrepreneurs - reﬁned
statutory deﬁnitions of state aid, strengthened responsibility of the organs that grant the aid, intro-
duced institutions for aid schemes. Regulations on regional, horizontal and sectoral aid, as well as on
procedures.
Slovenia
1999 New Competition Act (30 June 1999). Introduces investigative powers, procedural rules and penalty
provisions. Guidelines on the treatment of joint ventures, market deﬁnition and dominance assessment.
Concept of joint dominance introduced. Possibility for negative clearance. Exemption of agreements
of minor importance, provided that they do not amount to hardcore restrictions of competition. Ap-
peals treated as administrative rather than civil procedures. Individual exemption granted for speciﬁed
duration and conditions. Explicit prohibition of horizontal and vertical restrictive agreements. Scope
of application extended to associations of undertakings and to concerted practices. Market share is an
important, but not exclusive criterion for determining dominance. Competencies in anti-dumping proce-
dures. Commission for State Aid Control established and rules of procedure adopted, but legal framework
still lacking.
2000 Procedural rules for notiﬁcation of concentrations. Decree on block exemptions and methodology for
deﬁning the relevant market. Framework Act on State Aid Control adopted.
2001 Implementing rules for the application of competition provisions in the Slovenia/EC Europe Agreement.
2002 Decree on block exemptions. Implementing legislation on the allocation of state aids for the rehabilitation
of companies in diﬃculty during restructuring and on economic zones.
Slovak Republic
1997 Enactment of implementing rules on application of competition provisions stipulated by the Europe
Agreement. Competencies in anti-dumping investigations.
302000 Comprehensive state aid law enacted. The agricultural sector’s exemption from antitrust rules is repealed.
De minimis rules, negative clearance and possibility for individual exemptions introduced.
2001 New Competition Act (May 2001). Introduces an adjusted concept of entrepreneur, clearer deﬁnitions
of third party rights and an extended demonstrative list of dominance abuse instances. Market share no
longer a criterion for dominance. Control of concentrations extended over joint ventures. Higher turnover
and market share thresholds for concentration notiﬁcation and a methodology for turnover calculation.
Concentrations are suspended until a decision has been issued, unless an exemption is granted. Increased
market share thresholds in the de minimis regime. Extended timeframes for issuing decisions. Leniency
program introduced, along with amended appeal procedures and terms for ﬁne calculation.
2002 Seven block exemption regulations. Simpliﬁed procedure for assessment of concentrations with negligible
impact. Competencies encompass assessment, evaluation, approval, monitoring and record keeping of
state aid. New rules for de minimis aid, aid for employment and training, regional development and
SMEs, as well as sensitive sectors. Act on Investment Incentives. Amended ﬁscal aid schemes.
31